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The rules that should govern competition and conduct in banking are currently the topics of
spirited debate. This paper proposes a rigorous welfare-theoretic methodology which can
provide a unifying focus for a wide range of regulatory and market structure issues in banking.
The methodology is then applied in an empirical study of recent FDIC bank merger decisions.
Evidence is found that potential welfare losses to borrowers and welfare gains to bank owners
do influence the decisions taken, and that borrowers and bank owners receive roughly equal
treatment by the regulator. The potential welfare losses to depositors, however, appear to be
generally ignored.
1. Introduction
The-banking industry is one of the most important and highly regulated
industries in the United States. Today profound changes in banking tech-
nology and the structure of the financial industry are occurring rapidly, and
the challenges to bank regulators and policy analysts are great. Though the
microeconomic theory of regulation applicable to ordinary goods and service
industries has recently witnessed considerable development, parallel develop-
ments in banking regulation have lagged behind. The purpose of this paper is
to address that deficiency.
Ever since Chandler (1938) and Alhadeff (1954) first applied Chamberlinian
models of monopolistic competition to problems of the banking industry,
theoretical and empirical studies of banking regulation and market structure
have been guided by a 'public interest' point of view. Specific notions of what
constitutes the public interest have been many and varied. The classic
indicators in such studies, however, have been some limited aspect of bank
'performance', such as bank costs, interest rates, or profitability [e.g., Bell and
Murphy (1968), Benston (1965, 1972), Flechsig (1965), Meyer (1967)]. The
relationship of the public interest to these measures of bank performance has
usually been understood by implicit analogies drawn between banking
markets and ordinary goods and service markets where such cost and price
*1 am grateful to Dwight Jaffee and Stephen Goldfeld for their advice and criticism. All
remaining errors are mine alone.
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performance measures can be rigorously linked to well-defined notions of'
productive efficiency and individual and social welfare.
The shortcomings of this approach to public interest analysis in banking
are twofold. First, no such single indicator as cost or price performance can
capture more than a limited dimension of overall social welfare. Bank cost
performance reveals something about productive efficiency, but is silent on
the subject of the welfare of the consumers of banking products. Interest rate
performance reveals something about consumers' welfare, but very little
about productive efficiency. What is needed is some tractable and empirically
usable criteria of social welfare which is capable of embracing all such partial
aspects of the social welfare simultaneously.
The second difficulty with public interest analyses of banking markets in
the Chamberlinian tradition is the fact that the analogies drawn between
banking and other industries are not always entirely legitimate. The charac-
teristic 'products' of banks, credit and debt instruments, or loans and
deposits, are intrinsically different from the products of other industries.
Agents' behavior in these markets largely summarize and reflect their
intertemporal allocation of resources between ordinary goods and service
markets in different time periods. This qualitative difference in the character
and time frame of agents' decision-making in these markets gives rise to
important differences between banking markets and other types of markets in
the relationship of observed behavior to common notions of welfare.
Recognizing its essentially normative character, the study of banking
regulation from a public interest point of view requires, first, the specification
of an index of the public interest which is coherent, comprehensive, and yet
flexible enough to allow for diverse views on distributional issues. In keeping
with the spirit of the Chamberlinian traditions of analysis in banking, this
should be some individualistic, utility-based criteria. A broad class of such
indicators can be conveniently formalized as Bergsonian-type social welfare
functions. Recognizing the unique characteristics of banking products and
the decision processes underlying agents' behavior in these markets, the
precise theoretical and empirical relationship between traditional market
performance measures and familiar notions of individual and social welfare
can be established rigorously.
In this paper, one such Bergsonian social welfare function which can
legitimately be applied to banking market analyses is proposed, and then
applied in an empirical study of the FDIC's decision-making' process in
recent bank merger cases. Section 2 of the paper provides an overview of the
construction and properties of the social welfare function itself. Building from
explicit intertemporal models of individual decision-making, a theoretically
exact measure of the influence of interest rate and wealth changes on
individual welfare can be defined. The relationship of this theoretical measure
to observable borrower and depositor surplus measures can then be specified,
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though the details of this relationship are fully explored elsewhere [Jehle
(1984)]. Aggregating over individuals, a comprehensive social welfare criteria
analogous to the simple sum of consumer and producer surplus is construc-
ted. Section 3 provides an example of how the welfare methods proposed in
section 2 can be applied in practice through an empirical analysis of
intergroup welfare tradeoffs in recent FDIC bank merger decisions. It is
found that if increased concentration through bank mergers affects tra-
ditional market performance variables, then the FDIC's decision-making
process generally results in consideration and roughly equal treatment being
given to the potential welfare gains to bank owners and welfare losses to
borrowers which are likely to follow. Welfare effects of merger on depositors,
however, appear generally to be ignored. The sensitivity of these general
conclusions to specific assumptions made in the analysis are tested and they
are found to be quite robust. Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.
2. A social welfare function for banking
The starting point in the construction of a usable Bergsonian social welfare
function applicable to banking market analyses must be a specification of the
relationship between market observables and individual welfare. Observable
individual demands for loans and deposits can be modelled as the outcome
of a standard Fisherian intertemporal utility maximization process, and these
can b~': used to establis'h the relationship between individual welfare and
observable market interest rates and wealth. To establish the essentials of the
argument with the least possible clutter, only the simplest two-period, two-
instrument case is considered here.
The individual is assumed to possess a non-decreasing, strictly quasicon-
cave utility function defined over consumption levels in the current and
future period, U( Co, C I), to be endowed with initial period wealth w, and to
expect with certainty future income YI . The individual faces fixed single-
period interest rates rand d at which he can borrow and lend, respectively. If
L*~°and D*~ 0, denote the future values of the amounts borrowed and
lent in the initial period, then the present values of borrowing and lending,
or the amounts actually borrowed and lent in the current period, are given
by L=(ljl +r)L* and D=(ljl +d)D*, respectively. Future period consump-
tion will then be given by future income plus the future value of net current
period lending, C I = YI +D*-L*. .
The individual's problem is to maximize utility. of consumption subject to
the constraint that current period consumption plus the present value of net
lending docs not exceed current resources. Given the relationship of C I to
D* and L*, this problem can be viewed equivalently as one of choosing Co,
D* and L* to maximize utility, subject to the present value constraint. An
indirect utility function, relating interest rates and wealth to individual
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utility, can be defined for this problem as follows:
r(r,d, w)= max U(C o, Y1 +D* -L*)
Co·D'.L'
s.t. Co+(_1)D*-(_I)L*=W.. I+d I+r
(1)
The dual of the indirect utility function, an analog to the usual expenditure
function, is defined as
e(r,d,v)= min Co+ (I/ 1+d)D*-(I/1 +r)L*
Co·D·,L·
(2)
s.t. U(C o, Y1 +D*-L*)=v.
It can easily be shown that r(r, d,w) is decreasing in r, increasing in d and
II', and that e(r, d,v) is increasing in r, decreasing in d, and increasing in v.
Application of the envelope theorem to the Lagrangian for the maximization
problem in (I), together with the definition of the present value demands L
and D establishes the following derivative property of the indirect utility
function:




ov/ow = 1+d D(r,d, w).
The fundamental tool for the analysis of individual welfare is the wealth-
compensation function, It, analogous to the income-compensation function
first introduced by Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971). This will be defined as the
minimum wealth necessary at one set of interest rates rand d to achieve the
maximum intertemporal utility level achieved at any other arbitrarily chosen
set of interest rates and wealth rO, dO, and woo It is defined implicitly as
(4)
It is clear from the definition that Il(r,d 1r, d, IV) = W. Differentiating with
respect to each of the interest rates, and using (3),
oll(r,dlrO,do,wo)
or ( 1) 1000I +r L(r,d,ll(r,d '. ,d ,w )),
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ad I +d r, ,II r, r, , w .
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(5)
For any arbitrarily chosen, but fixed, interest rates rO > r and dO < d it can
be shown that there exists a strictly monotonic increasing transformation of
the original indirect utility function r(r, d,w), which allows the same ordinal
properties of the individual's preferences to be represented by the 'dollar-
scaled' indirect utility function v*(·), where I
*( / ')- (0 /01 / ')_'J°L(~,d,/I(~,dlr,d,w»d;:v r, ( ,II - JI r ,( r, t. , I I - ;: ..
r 1+ ..
(6)
The integrals in (6) give the compensating variation in wealth for an
interest rate change from rand d to rO and c/o, or the wealth adjustment
necessary when facing rates rO and c/O to achieve the utility level reached
when facing r,c/ and having wealth II'. These integrals can be thought of as
areas under sequentially shifted 'Hicksian' or compensated demand functions
for loans and deposits. While the indirect utility function v* is measured in
terms of observable 'dollar' or wealth units, its level cannot be directly
observ~d since the Hicksian demands cannot be directly observed.
It is possible, however, to define observable surplus measures, analogous to
ordinary consumer surplus measures, which approximate the true compen-
sating variation to a high and quantifiable degree of accuracy. Let borrower
surplus, BS, and depositor surplus, DS, be defined as the (discounted) areas
under sequentially shifted 'Fisherian' or observable individual demands for
loans and deposits, and calculated as
BS == 'Jo L(~, d,w)d v
r 1+~ ~,
DS == 1D(r,~, w) d~.
dO I +~
(7)
It is important to notice that the surplus measures BS and DS defined here
are not simply the areas under loan and deposit demand functions between
two interest rate levels. They are those simple surplus areas 'discounted' over
ITo verify that (6) generates the same demand behavior as (I), substitute from the I.h.s. of (5)
under the integrals in (6), differentiate with respect to r, d, and 11", substitut e from the r.h.s, of (5),
and form the ratios in (3).
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the range of integration by the factor 1/(1+ ~). This discounting is necessary
in order for the observable surplus to conform to the proper ex ante, or
beginning of period, compensating variation in wealth. Failure to calculate
the observable surpluses in this way can lead to significant measurement
errors and result in spurious welfare inferences.
Letting T be the difference between the unobservable compensating
variation and the observable BS and DS measures, the individual's indirect
utility function can be rewritten as
v*(r,d, w)=BS+DS+w+ T. (8)
Except for the error term 1', (8) gives an index of individual welfare
measured in observable units which can be calculated from observable
market data. Results analogous to those derived by Wittig (1976) on
estimating compensating variation in income with ordinary consumer surplus
can be obtained on estimating the compensating variation in wealth with BS
and DS. As in the usual case, upper and lower bounds on the error T can be
obtained from observable market data which show that its size is negligible
in most realistic situations likely to be encountered in practice [Jehle (1983,
1984)].
A simple Bergsonian social welfare function capable of serving as a
regulatory objective function can easily be constructed using (8).2 For a
society of s individuals, the general Bergsonian social welfare function takes
the form SJV =SJV(V1" •• , V.), where Vi is the utility level of individual i.
SJV may be made to depend on interest rates and wealth by substituting the
indirect utility functions for the V i' Letting SJV take the simple linear form:
•
SJV = L ojvf(r, d, "'J
j =1
(9)
The coefficients OJ measure the welfare weight accorded to each individual's
utility level in the eyes of the regulator and, if all 0/ > 0, this welfare func-
tion satisfies the 'Pareto property'. If, for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed
that the set of s individuals in the regulator's constituency can be partitioned
into three disjoint subsets consisting of borrowers, depositors and bank
owners, and that the regulator views each group member as indistinguishable
from the others in the same group, then, using (8), the social welfare function
can be written as the weighted sum of borrower and ' depositor wealth,
aggregate borrower and depositor surplus, aggregate bank profits and an
error term. If some regulatory policy act is expected to affect loan and
2Bergsonian welfare functions have several well-known limitations which must be kept in
mind in any application. However, if wealth redistribution is out side the sphere of policy options
for the regulator, Willig (1979) has shown that the Bergsonian approach is an appropriate one.
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deposit interest rates and bank profits then, using (8) and (9), the change in
social welfare expected to result from the policy act can be decomposed into
the weighted sum
(10)
where the a, measure the regulator's inter-group welfare weights, LJn
measures the change in bank profits, and LJBS and LJDS measure the changes
in borrower and depositor surplus calculated from aggregate, market-level
demands for loans and deposits. Upper and lower bounds on the error term
T* can be calculated using upper and lower bounds on the wealth elasticities
of market demands for loans and deposits, and it can be shown that this
error will generally be small.'
Much less stringent assumptions than those made here for the sake of
expositional clarity are sufficient to justify the general form of the social
welfare function given in (10). Though these issues are specifically addressed
elsewhere, it bears noting that it is a straightforward and easy matter to
allow for the existence of an arbitrarily large number of deposit and loan
instruments with different maturities which banks might offer, and to allow
for the borrowing and lending of firms in addition to that of individuals.
Within this same framework, it is also possible to expand the scope of
analysis to include consideration of banking activities other than borrowing
and lending, such as the provision of financial and transactional services. The
large and highly developed literature on the welfare analysis of firms that
produce ordinary goods and services is directly applicable to the analysis of
banks' activities in these areas, and is entirely compatible with and integrable
into the social welfare function given in (9) and (10).
When borrower and depositor surplus measures are defined and calculated
as in (7), indexes of social welfare change such as (10) have several nice
properties and can playa useful and important role in the formulation and
assessment of banking regulatory policy. First, they strongly resemble in
spirit and substance the familiar sum of producer and consumer surplus
widely used as an index of social welfare in most theoretical and applied
analyses of policy and performance in markets for ordinary goods and
services. Second, they provide the regulator or policy analyst with an
empirically usable tool with a clear and quantifiable relation to rigorous and
commonly accepted notions of individual and social welfare. Finally, and
most importantly, like all social welfare functions, (10) offers the analyst .a
criterion for evaluating policy which simultaneously incorporates the often
countervailing considerations of equity and efficiency.
JSee Jehle (1983) for details of the bounding procedure.
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3. Welfare tradeoffs in bank mergers
In the present era of limited branch banking, one of the most important
tasks of the bank regulatory authorities is to evaluate and rule on bank
merger requests. In ruling on any merger application, the Bank Merger Act
requires that '... the Comptroller, The Board, or The Corporation (FDIC) ...
take into consideration. the effect of the transaction on competition ... and
shall not approve the transaction unless ... it finds the transaction to be in
the public interest'.
The stipulation in the act to consider the impact of proposed mergers on
competition when making the public interest test derives in large part from
the structure-performance (S-P) doctrine. This literature, a direct descendant
of the post-Chamberlinian industrial organization literature, holds that
banking structure - the number and/or size distribution of firms - affects the
conduct of those firms and thereby affects market performance. A tremen-
dous amount of empirical work, represented over the years by such well-
known studies as those by Schweiger and McGee (1961), Bell and Murphy
(1969), and Heggestad and Mingo (1976, 1977), has explored the influence of
structure on performance, variously defined, and sought to quantify their
relationship.
The debate on these questions has been long-lived and extensive, and will
probably never be definitively resolved. Rhoades (1977), for one, argues that
the consensus of this literature is that structure does affect performance, and
that increased concentration tends to be associated with higher loan rates,
lower deposit rates and greater bank profitability. At the same time, there is
no shortage of works whose reading of largely the same body of literature
seriously questions Rhoades' view.
Regardless of which view may ultimately be judged to be the 'correct' one,
there is substantial evidence in the published merger decisions of the FDIC,
the Board, and the Comptroller of a serious concern with the possible effects
of increased concentration through bank mergers on loan interest rates,
deposit interest rates, and bank profitability. The attention paid by bank
regulators to these market performance measures reflects an implicit aware-
ness of, and concern with, the welfare impact of changes in those perfor-
mance measures which might follow from their decision. It is intuitively clear,
and easily shown using (8), that these interest rate and profit effects would
generally be expected to cause welfare gains to bank owners and welfare
losses to borrowers and depositors. Drawing on the findings of the S-P
literature, borrower and depositor surplus can be used to make accurate
estimates of these welfare changes for any proposed merger. Given an agreed
upon set of distributional weights, these surplus calculations could be used to
calculate the net effect of the merger on social welfare using (10). If this
approach were to be taken, the 'benign' regulator would be expected to
approve mergers for which LlSW>O and deny those for which LlSW<0.
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Clearly, no such explicit balancing of gains and losses is a formal part of
the actual regulatory decision-making process. However, at least two impor-
tant questions about that process itself arise. First, if gains to some and losses
to others will predictably follow from any decision taken, to what extent does
the actual decision-making process take account of them? Second, if such
tradeoffs are an inevitable outcome of the process, what can be said about
the appropriateness or social desirability of the kind of tradeoffs actually
being made?
The purpose of this section is to investigate these two questions by
focusing on a sample of recent merger decisions taken by the FDIC. First,
bench-mark estimates of market-level demands for loans and deposits will be
made in the markets affected by the mergers. These demand functions,
together with evidence from the literature relating changes in market
concentration to changes in interest rates and bank profits, will be used to
calculate the changes in borrower surplus, depositor surplus, and bank
profits which could have been anticipated at the time the proposal to merge
was made. These calculated welfare effects will then be used as data in a
probit analysis designed to determine the role they played in influencing the
pattern of decisions taken by the FDIC.
3.1. Data and methods
The analysis was conducted for a sample of merger decisions taken by the
FDIC over the ten-year period 1970-1979. The sample contained banks in 12
unit-banking or limited branch banking states, and excluded any cases for
which the FDIC's report cited concerns for either bank's solvency as a
contributing factor in its decision." For the eventual welfare calculations to
be meaningful, they must be made from demand functions which reflect, as
well as possible, the conditions in the 'relevant market'. The problems of
defining the relevant market in banking are well-known in the literature [e.g.
Stolz (1976), Gelder and Budzeika (1970)J, and will not be addressed here.
For the purposes of this study, the appropriate definition of the relevant
market is the one actually used by the FDIC in its analysis of the merger
proposal and cited in its published decision. These relevant banking markets
were often very small geographic areas, and, at the same time, the smallest
geographic area for which relatively reliable bank, economic, and demo-
graphic data are available is the county. Therefore, only decisions for which
the county, or groups of counties, had been considered by the authorities to
be the relevant market were selected for the sample. The principles of market
definition, data availability, and exclusion of cases decided on the issue of
4The published decisions of the FDIC and the opinions of the Justice Department are given in
the FDIC Annual Reports, 197(}-1979.
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bank solvency which guided the sample selection lead unavoidably to a
sample consisting of only 32 decisions over the ten-year period. While, the
resulting sample contained proportions of approvals and denials which were
approximately the same as those in all cases considered by the FDIC over
the period, the results to be presented below must be interpreted in the light
of the size of the sample from which they were obtained.
Finally, the high degree of aggregation in the publicly available data even
at the county level made it impossible to distinguish between loan and
deposit instruments of different maturities. It will be assumed therefore that
agents possess a single-period planning horizon and that there is only one
loan instrument and one deposit instrument, time and savings deposits.
A very simple approach was adopted to estimate the market level demand
functions for loans and deposits. The observed values of the loan interest rate
and loan volumes were taken to be determined by the market level demand
and supply of loans. Similarly, the deposit interest rate and deposit volumes
were viewed as determined by a separate two-equation market model of
supply and demand for deposits. The simple supply and demand framework
was deemed satisfactory since all that were hoped for in the initial stages of
the analysis, given the nature of the available data, were bench-mark
estimates of the structural demand functions.
Market level bank data for each of the markets were prepared and
supplied by the Federal Reserve from the Reports of Condition and Reports
of-Income of all banks operating in the different markets over the period
1970-1979. Economic and demographic data for the same markets were
prepared and supplied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Cross-sectional and
time series data on all markets were pooled and per-capita estimates of the
structural demand for loans and demand for deposits were made using two-
stage least squares. This method 'was used to estimate only the demand-side
of the loan and deposit market models, with the supply-sides providing
instruments.
Several forms for the respective demand equations were tested. All dollar
quantities were measured in 1972 prices using the GNP deflator, and the
following variables were used:
L = per capita loans,
D = per capita time and savings deposits,
LIR = interest income/total loans,
DIR = interest on deposits/time and savings deposits,
INC = per capita income, and
UR = unemployment rate.
The log linear form for the loan equation and linear form for the deposit
equation yielded the best results. The results of these regressions are reported
in table 1.
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Table 1
Bench-mark estimates of loan and deposit demand in FDIC bank merger cases, 1970-1979 3
R2 Durbin-Watson
log (Li,)= 3.67 -0.857 log (LIRi,l+ 1.0910g(/NCi,)+0.22510g(URi, )
(5.11)( -2.10) (4.68) (2.97)
D,,=2.85+ 135.41D/R,,+ 186.75/NCi,
(0.987) (2.60) (2.64)
i=I, ... ,32, t=I, ... ,1O
0.68 1.94
0.73 1.82
"lnstrumental variables used in the estimation of the loan equation were, in logarithms: per-
capita income and total deposits, unemployment rate, three-month Treasury Bill rate and one
period lags of the income, unemployment rate, loan interest rate, and per-capita loan variables.
For the deposit equations: per-capita income and total loans, three-month Treasury Bill rate,
and one period lags of the income, deposit rate, and time and savings deposit variables. By
treating deposit market variables as exogenous to the loan market system, and loan market
variables as exogenous to the deposit market system, the two-stage least squares estimates of the
interest rate coefficients in both models may be biased. The sensitivity of the subsequent analysis
to the specific coefficient estimates here will be examined in section 4.
Numbers in parentheses are r-statistics,
Given the high level of aggregation in the data, the estimated equations
perform reasonably well. Both equations show estimated coefficients for the
income, unemployment rate, and respective interest rate variables which are
large relative to their standard errors and whieh have the expected signs. The
demand for loans is inversely related to the loan interest rate, and the
demand for deposits is positively related to the deposit interest rate. Both
loans and deposits are 'normal', with demands increasing as income increases."
The coefficient on the unemployment rate variable in the loan demand
equation, intended to capture cyclical effects, is positive, and may reflect
counter-cyclical borrowing behavior of firms to finance inventories and of
individuals to maintain standards of living over the cycle.
By treating deposit market variables as exogenous to the loan market
system, and loan market variables as exogenous to the deposit market
system, the two-stage least squares estimates of the interest rate coefficients
in both models may be biased. However, since these results generally
conform to those obtained in other studies, and since all that is hoped for at
this stage are reasonable bench-mark estimates of the relevant parameters,
these equations serve satisfactorily as the basis for the initial surplus
calculations. The sensitivity of the subsequent analysis 'to the specific
coefficient estimates here will be examined in subsection 3.3.
5tncome data was used as a proxy for wealth. No serious problem should arise from this
substitution since income and wealth tend to be highly and positively correlated. See Projector
(1966).
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The welfare effect of a merger on borrowers is directly due to the change
in loan interest rates and is measured by the change in borrower surplus.
The effect on depositors is due to the change in deposit rates and is
measured by the change in depositor surplus. The change in loan rates and
deposit rates, in turn, are due to the structure-conduct relationship assumed
to characterize banks' behavior as concentration changes. The welfare effect
on bank owners may be thought of as due to these changes in loan and
deposit rates, plus any cost savings achieved through consolidation, and is
measured by the change in bank profits.
Estimates of these expected welfare effects were made using a simple
method. Expected surplus changes depend on pre-merger and expected post-
merger deposit and loan interest rate levels. The expected profit changes
depend on pre-merger and expected post-merger profits. The pre-merger
interest rates and profits are known - they are the ones prevailing at the time
of the application to merge. The expected post-merger interest rate and profit
levels may be calculated by drawing on the considerable body of work that
has been done in the S-P literature estimating the relationship of market
interest rate levels and bank profit levels to the level of market
concentration.
The range of choice from among the large number of such studies is,
fortunately, restricted by the fact that most have employed the n-firm
concentration ratio, for 11=1, 2 or 3, as the index of market concentration.
These studies will not be useful since most mergers in general, as well as in
the sample, are between banks that are not among the market's two or three
largest. A smaller subset of more recent S-P studies employ the Herfindhal
index, H = 2:i sl, where 0~ s,~ 1 is the ith firm's market share, and i runs
over all firms in the market. The H measure permits interest rate and profit
effects to be computed for mergers between banks of any size in the same
market.
The procedure for these calculations is straightforward. Let r = r(H) be the
estimated relationship between the average market loan interest rate and the
Herfindhal. A merger between banks 1 and 2 having market shares SI and S2
will cause a change in the Herfindhal of .dH=2s1S2>O, and a change in the
market loan rates of .dr=(or(H)joH)·2s1S2 • For the relation d=d(H) between
market deposite rates and the Herfindhal, the same merger gives rise to a
change in deposit rates of Ad= (od(H)joH). 2S 1S2 • Similarly, S-P studies
which regress net income over total assets on the Herfindhal can be used to
compute the expected change in bank profits. Letting ROR(H) denote this
relationship, and letting T A denote total assets, the total expected change in
bank profits in the affected market is Al]= (oROR(H)joH) . T A'2S2S2 • The
S-P hypothesis predicts that .dr~O, .dd~O, and .dn~o.
The expected surplus changes are obtained by integrating the demand
equations in table 1 between the pre-merger' and expected post-merger
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interest rates, and evaluating the integrals at the income level and unemploy-
ment rate prevailing in market i at the time t of application to merge. For
pre-merger rates rO and dO, and post-merger rates r' = rO +zlr and d'= dO +Ltd,




d' I +~ .. - ,
(11)
While it may be fair to say there is some agreement on the qualitative
aspects of the S-P relation, there is much less agreement on the nature and
empirical magnitude of the relationships. From among the many available
studies, several were chosen as representative. The most common specifica-
tion of the relationship is a simple linear one. Heggestad and Mingo (H-M)
(1976) give estimates for the linear relationship between H and the loan
interest rate, 8r(H)j8H, and the deposit interest rate, ad(1l)j8H. Yeats (1974)
also gives linear estimates of the interest rate effects as well as a linear
estimate of the profitability effects, 8ROR(H)j8H. Yeats finds a larger effect
than Heggestad and Mingo on deposit rates, and a smaller effect on loan
rates. Yeats also finds a larger effect on profitability than Rhoades (1980).
Non-linear and dichotomous relationships between H and the interest rate
variables have been investigated by Heggestad and Mingo (1976, 1977). Their
results suggest that increases in concentration have relatively large effects
when concentration is low, and less effect when markets become more
concentrated. In the extreme dichotomous approach, increases in con-
centration have no effect on loan rates once concentration reaches a rather
low critical level. The results of these studies are summarized in table 2.
Each entry in table 2 gives the estimated number of basis points of change
in loan rates, deposit rates, or ROR for everyone hundred basis points of
change in the Herfindhal. For example, if two banks with market shares of
20 percent each merge, the change in the Herfindhal would be 0.08, or 800
basis points. According to the H-M linear estimates, this would cause an
increase of 16 basis points in the average loan rate in the affected market.
For any choice of study made from table 2, the expected changes in
borrower surplus, depositor surplus, and bank profits can be calculated using
(II). Recalling the linear social welfare function presented in (9), and
normalizing it to a per-capita basis, the regulator can expect the proposed
562 G.A. Jehle, Regulation and the public interest
Table 2
Bank performance measures and the Herfindhal (11)
index.
Author (type of cr cd ilROR
relationship) ou all C1l
H-M (linear) 1.98 -0.27
Yeats (linear) 0.90 -4.7 1.70
Rhoades (linear) 0.40
0.06 -0.01




merger to cause a change in the welfare of a 'representative individual' in a
given market equal to the weighted sum in (10). The regulator is assumed to
approve the merger if LlSWi>0, and to deny it if LlSTt/ < O. Since the left-
hand side of (10) is unobserved, it is impossible to directly estimate the inter-
group weights aj • The approach will therefore have to be somewhat indirect.
Letting Y be a binary variable, where Y= 1 if the merger is approved and
Y=0 if denied, the model to be estimated will take the form:
(12)
The stochastic error term U~ N(O, (}2) captures the non-systematic or
capricious elements in the regulator's decision-making process. In models
with binary dependent variables, ordinary least squares estimates of the
parameters are unbiased, but not efficient, due to heteroskedasticity. Several
methods exist to deal with this problem, all involving a transformation of the
linear index on the right-hand side of (12) such that the dependent variable is
constrained to take values between zero and one [McFadden (1976)]. Probit
analysis is the one such technique which will be employed here.
Letting PX j stand for the right-hand side of (12), probit analysis employs a
cumulative standard normal transform of the linear index pX j • From among
the several methods which can be used to estimate the parameters of the
probit model, Goldfeld and Quandt (1972) have shown the maximum
likelihood method to produce reasonable estimates of the parameters in
small samples. The interpretation of the estimated coefficients in the probit
model is somewhat eccentric and so bears some discussion before turning to
consider the results. The dependent variable in the model is the conditional
probability of approval of the merger, given particular values for the welfare
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variables. The index pX i , the probit of the probability of approval, is defined
as the abscissa corresponding to the probability of approval in a standard
normal distribution. The estimated probability of the merger being approved,
given values Xi for the surplus and profit changes, is
(13)
The coefficients Pi' i> 1,3, can be interpreted, therefore, as the number of
standard deviations of change in P(A IXi) for everyone dollar change in
borrower surplus, depositor surplus, or bank profits. The constant term, Po,
gives the number of standard deviations worth of area under the standard
normal distribution which must be added to or subtracted from 0.5 (equal
probability of approval and denial) to obtain the probability of the merger
being approved when all expected welfare changes are zero [Watson (1974)].
For a merger expected to result in the vector Xi of welfare changes, a
measure of the responsiveness of the probability of approval to one dollar
changes in the welfare of each of the three groups can be obtained by
differentiating (13) with respect to elements of Xi' The change in the
probability of a merger being approved per unit change in the expected
welfare gain to group j is given by
.oP(AIXi) a _1_ -(PX,)2/2
oX. : 1Ji(2n)I/2e .
I,)
(14)
The sign of the estimated coefficient, therefore, does provide qualitative
information on the direction of influence exerted on the probability of
approval by changes in the welfare of the different groups.
In addition to discovering such qualitative information, another objective
is to assess whether the three groups' welfare are considered 'equally' by the
regulator, or whether the regulatory decision making process tends to be
'biased' in favor of welfare gains for particular groups. One measure of this
bias is the relative sensitivity of the probability of approval to changes in the
welfare of the different groups. By (14), this reduces to a simple comparison
of the two estimated coefficients:
oP/axi•i Pi
enex., 13k' (15)
In the next section, the results of estimating the model under different
assumptions about the nature and magnitude of the mergers' effects on
interest rates and profits are reported.
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3.2. Results
Table 2 showed that there is considerable disagreement over the extent of
the movement in interest rates and profits as concentration changes. To
account for a broad range of possible structure-performance relationships
which may be operative, eq. (12) was estimated over surplus and profit
changes calculated on the basis of several different combinations of the
possible relationships reflected in table 2. Table 3 summarizes the results of
estimating the probit model when four different loan rate, three deposit rate,
and two profitability relations are assumed.
The low 1.2-statistics for eqs. (VHVIII), which assume non-linear and
dichotomous relationships between concentration and market performance
variables, show that the null hypothesis that all coefficients other than the
constant are equal to zero cannot be rejected. This suggests that if the
structure-performance relationship is non-linear or dichotomous, then the
evidence in the sample does not support the conclusion that borrowers',
depositors' and bank owners' welfare are of any consequence to the decision
reached. Eqs. (IHIV), however, which assume the kind of linear relationship
between structure and performance which is most common in the S-P
literature, do permit the conclusion that at least two of the three groups'
welfare are implicitly being taken into consideration by the FDIC in its
decision-making. Consequently, further discussion will be restricted to eqs.
(IHIV).
ECIS. (IHIV) yield basically similar qualitative conclusions. Under both
linear versions of the structure-performance relationship, regardless of the
linear profitability relation considered, the estimated coefficients on borrower
surplus and profit changes are positive and significantly different from zero
at the 90 percent level. In none of ·the equations is the estimated coefficient
on depositor surplus changes significantly different from zero. These results
suggest that, ceteris paribus, larger expected welfare gains (smaller welfare
losses) to borrowers tend to increase the probability of the merger being
approved. Larger expected welfare gains accruing to bank owners also tend
to increase the probability of approval. At the same time, the results
consistently show that the level of expected welfare losses to depositors has
no effect on the probability of any given merger being approved.
The estimated coefficients may, in principle, be used to make inferences
about the quantitative relationship between the welfare effects of a proposed
merger and the probability of the merger's approval. Eqs. (.t3) and (14) show
that the probability of a merger's approval and the responsiveness of that
probability to changes in expected welfare depend importantly on the precise
magnitudes of the expected welfare effects. For the sake of illustration,
consider the case of an 'average' merger, where the expected welfare losses to
borrowers and the expected welfare gains to owners are assumed to be equal
to the average values of the variables over the sample. For the structure-
Table 3
Welfare and the estimated probit of merger approval,"
Assumption on Estimated coefficient on
Dr vJ DROR Constant LiDS LiDS Lin R2
Eq. DII eJ/1 vII t/o t/I t/2 113 x2 (max.=0.71)
(I) H-M (linear) Rhoades 1.0906 0.0509 -0.1180 0.0500 9.97 0.27 C'J
(2.80) (1.89) (-0.78) (1.63) ;..
(II) Yeats - - - 0.0117 - - ...'"(1.63) ::-."
Yeats (linear)
:>::l
(III) Rhoades 1.0790 0.1107 -0.0067 0.0505 9.88 0.27 ~
(2.79) (1.84) (-0.74) (1.65) l::Q




(V) H-M (non-linear) Rhoades """0.8044 -0.0014 0.0664 -0.0050 3.18 0.09 ::-
(2.14) (-0.31) (0.55) (-0.58) '"""(VI) Yeats - - - -0.0012 - - E:(-0.58) ,,'
5'
(VII) H-M H-M Rhoades 0.8352 0.0019 0.1290 0.0403 5.41 0.16 ~...
(Dichoto- (linear) (2.48) (0.81) (1.50) (1.28) '"~
mous)
(VIII) Yeats - - - 0.0094
(1.28)
"Numbers in parentheses arc r-statistics.
Critical I for 90 percent significance level is 1.31.
Critical X2 for 95 percent significance level is 9.49.
'-' denotes same as in the previous equation. In general, even-numbered equations differ Irorr odd-numbered
equations only in the size of the estimated coefficient on the profit change variable. All other coefficients, 1.1
v.statistics, X2 and R2 are the same. r:;;..
v.
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performance assumption on interest rates underlying eqs. (I) and (II), the
mean per capita expected loss in borrower surplus is -S5.61, and the mean
expected loss in depositor surplus is - $0.89. For eqs. (III) and (IV), mean
borrower surplus loss is -$2.56 and mean depositor surplus loss is -SI5.35.
For eqs. (I) and (III), mean expected gain in bank profits is S2.18, and for
eqs. (II) and (IV) is $9.35. Letting X denote the vector of expected welfare
changes from this hypothetical merger, an estimate of the probability that
this merger would be approved can be obtained by evaluating (13) at X.
Calculations of P(A IX) for all combinations of structure-performance
relations represented in eqs. (IHIV) yielded virtually identical results. In all
cases, the estimated probability of an average merger being approved was
approximately 0.65, which, of course, is approximately equal to the sample
fraction of approvals. This contrasts with an estimate of the probability of a
merger being approved when expected welfare changes for all groups are
equal to zero, P(A IX =0), which can be obtained from the constant term.
That figure, for all equations, is roughtly 0.86. The difference between these
two figures clearly supports the conclusion that the adverse welfare impact of
mergers on depositors tends not to be a major consideration to decision-
makers, but that the adverse effect on borrowers is an important consideration.
That is, any merger, insofar as it is expected, through increased concentration,
to adversely affect the welfare of borrowers, tends to have a lower probability
of being approved than a merger which is not expected to adversely affect
borrowers.
Estimates of the degree to which the probability of approval is affected by
changes in welfare incidence can be obtained using eq. (14). Again for the
case of the average merger, estimates of ap(AIX)/axi,i for the two factors
exerting a significant influence (borrower surplus and profits) were calculated
for all four equations. A one dollar per-capita reduction in the expected loss
in borrower surplus under eq. (I) tends to increase P(A IX) by approximately
0.019. Under eq. (III), that figure is roughly twice as high, 0.041. The
marginal increase in probability for increases in bank profits in both eqs. (I)
and (III) was approximately 0.019. For eqs. (II) and (IV), those figures were
considerably lower; both approximately 0.004. The rankings of relative
sensitivity across equations in this example are directly due to the estimated
relationships between concentration and interest rates and profitability. in
table 2. The relatively large effect of concentration on loan rates in the H-M
study compared to the Yeats study in table 2 means that relatively larger
losses in borrower surplus would be expected. Given the observed pattern of
decisions made, this leads to a relatively lower marginal (and absolute)
weight being given to the welfare of borrowers in eq. (I) compared with (III).
Similarly, the greater sensitivity of bank profitability to concentration in the
Yeats study compared with Rhoades' leads to. the lower marginal (and
absolute) weights accorded owners' welfare in eqs. (II) and (IV), compared
with (I) and (III).
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While suggestive, a certain amount of caution is called for in interpreting
the results of these illustrative calculations. Eqs. (13) and (14) show the
dependence of the estimated absolute and marginal probabilities of approval
on the magnitudes of the expected welfare effects of particular mergers. One
cannot, therefore, infer from these results that every merger has a 0.65
probability of being approved. It depends on the magnitudes of the expected
welfare effects. Moreover, the insignificance of the depositor surplus variable
in all of the estimated equations suggests that a different specification of the
relation in eq. (12), which did not include depositor surplus as a consider-
ation to the decision-makers, would lead to different estimated coefficients on
borrowers' and owners' welfare variables and so, therefore, lead to different
quantitative estimates of conditional absolute and marginal probabilities of
approval for a given merger. If one were interested in prediction, therefore, a
different specification of the relation in (12) would be called for."
The purposes here, however, are more qualitative than quantitative. The
estimated eqs. (IHIV) and the illustrative calculations suggest, first, that
depositors' welfare is not an important consideration. Second, they suggest
that borrowers' and owners' welfare are important considerations, but that
inferences about the relative implicit weight attached to the two groups'
welfare may be highly dependent on the particular structure-performance
mechanism assumed to be operative. For any given mechanism assumed, eq.
(14) shows that a measure of the relative bias displayed between the two
groups 'c'~m be obtained by considering the ratio of the estimated coefficients
from table 3. Table 4 gives the relative preference shown borrowers' welfare
over owners' welfare implied by eqs. (IHIV). It is clear from these calcul-
ations that the extent of the relative bias in favor of borrowers' welfare varies
considerably according to the structure-performance mechanism assumed.
However, the more limited conclusion that the FDIC's behavior displays
somebias in favor of borrowers appears to be robust to very large differences
in the particular structure-performance mechanism assumed." In only one
case out of the four is there any reason to infer that close to equal treatment
of the two groups results from the FDIC's decision-making process.
It seems on the basis of these calculations that there is little support for
'capture theoretic' explanations of the regulatory process in the case of FDIC
6Estimates of the probit coefficients were calculated when the depositor surplus variable was
dropped from the specification in (12). In all cases, the size of the constant term remained
virtually the same, reflecting no significant difference in the probability of approval when surplus
and profit changes are zero from that reported in the text. The size of the coefficient on
borrower surplus generally decreased and that on profit change generally increased, reflecting
somewhat lower and higher marginal probabilities, respectively, than those reported in the text.
None of these results, however, alters the qualitative conclusion drawn in the text, nor do they
lead to significantly different predictions of the probability of approval of an average merger.
7The same general pattern of relative preference persists when depositor surplus is dropped
from the version (I)-(IV) equations.
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Table 4













'Numbers reported are Pt/PJ.
Numerals in parentheses are corresponding equations
in table 3.
merger decisions over the sample period. If anything, relatively greater
consideration appears to be given to the interests of at least one group which
stands to be adversely affected, borrowers, over the interest of the regulated
firms themselves. Caution is again in order, however, in trying to infer too
much from these results. No degree of statistical certainty can be attached to
these general conclusions because of the impossibility of constructing the
appropriate tests of hypotheses concerning the estimates of the relevant
absolute and marginal probabilities."
3.3 Sensitivity analysis
The results just considered appear to support the argument that the effects
of mergers on depositors are generally ignored. There is also the suggestion
that the welfare of borrowers tends to be more of a concern to the FDIC
than that of bank owners. However, in view of some of the limitations of the
empirical analysis, it is worthwhile considering the sensitivity of these general
conclusions to some of the particular assumptions that have been made.
One possibly crucial assumption that has been maintained throughout is
that the loan and deposit demand equations in table 1 serve satisfactorily as
the basis for the borrower and depositor surplus calculations used in the
probit analysis. At least two objections might be raised to this. One is that
the underlying assumption that individuals are identical in their demand
behavior across markets is not justified: It could be argued that demand
equations for each individual market should be used as the basis for the
SOne- and two-tailed tests of the hypothesis that the 11\0 coefficients themselves are equal can
be made using standard r-tests or x2-tests, since the estimators are normally distributed with
known means and the variance and covariance can be estimated. From eq. (14), however, the
difference in the marginal changes in the probability of approval between any two groups does
not have such a simple distribution.
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surplus calculations. This objection, though entirely legitimate, cannot,
however, be addressed here. Investigating the sensitivity of the general
conclusions to this assumption must be left to more refined analyses.
If this assumption is accepted, however, there is still the question of how
the general results depend on the particular estimates of the parameters of
the loan and deposit demand equations. As noted earlier, because of the
small size of the available sample and the simple approach that was taken in
estimating these demand equations, they can, at best, only be expected to
have produced reasonable bench-mark estimates of the demand relationships.
More or less elastic demands for loans or deposits could, for a given change
in the interest rate expected to result from the merger, lead to possibly
significant differences in the estimated surplus losses in the sample of cases
considered. The regulator may, for example, be viewing deposit demands as
more elastic than assumed in eq. (4). In such a case, the expected loss in
depositor surplus would be smaller. The pattern of decisions taken, therefore,
might reflect a greater weight given depositors' welfare than was revealed in
the previous analysis.
To investigate this possibility, a pseudo comparative statics, or sensitivity
analysis, was performed on the results of eqs. (I)--(IV). The coefficient on the
interest rate variable in the deposit equation was increased and decreased by
one and two standard deviations of its estimate, with appropriate adjust-
ments of the constant term being made to the mean of the dependent
variable, Depositor surplus iosses for all decisions in the sample were
recomputed for these four versions of the deposit demand equation, and
versions I-IV of the probit equations were re-estimated. The results of these
estimations are summarized in table 5.
In all equations, there is no dramatic divergence from the previous body of
results. In all cases, borrowers' and owners' welfare are shown to be
significant contributing factors in the decision made. In no case is the
coefficient on depositor surplus ever significantly different from zero. The
earlier finding that the FDIC tends to ignore the welfare effects of its
decisions on depositors, seems, therefore, to be quite robust over a broad
range of possible deposit demand elasticities that the decision maker may
perceive,"
The measure of relative preference towards borrowers is somewhat more
sensitive to the estimates of the deposit demand equation parameters. While
the structure-performance versions II-IV consistently suggest some pre-
9Furlher tests were made to test the sensitivity of this conclusion 10 differences in the
perceived loan demand elastic ities as well. The slope of the loan demand equation in table 1 was
adjusted up and down by one and two standard deviations of its estimate. and the probit
equ ations were estimated with surpluses calculated for all possible combinations of loan and
deposito rate elasticities. None of these showed estimated coefficients on the depositor surplus
variable significantly different from zero .
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Table 5
Sensitivity of probit estimates to the interest coefficient of deposit demand.'
Adjustment of Relative
deposit rate R~ preference
Version coefficient Constant JBS L1DS L1n X~ Max=O.72 #./#3
I -2 1.0990 0.0615 -0.1746* 0.0520 10.43 0.28 1.2
II 0.0\2\ 5.1
-\ 1.0963 0.0560 -0.1460* 0.0505 10.20 0.27 1.1
0.0120 4."7
+1 1.0836 0.0466 -0.0930* 0.0503 9.97 0.27 1.02
0.0117 4.4
+2 1.0765 0.0432 -0.0716* 0.0510 9.66 0.27 0.8
0.0119 3.6
III -2 1.0925 0.1350 -0.0101* 0.0520 10.38 0.28 2.6
IV 0.012\ \1.2
-I 1.0870 0.1224 -0.0084* 0.0507 10.1 \ 0.27 2.4
0.0118 10.4
+\ 1.0704 0.1006 -0.0051* 0.0510 9.69 0.27 2.0
0.0119 8.5
+2 1.0625 0.0924 -0.0037* 0.0521 9.54 0.26 1.8
0.0\2\ 7.6
'*Denotes not significant at 90 percent level.
All other reported coefficients significant at 90 percent level or above.
Even-numbered equations are, again, identical to the preceding odd-numbered one, except for the
size of the profit change coefficient.
ference shown to borrowers, this conflicts sharply with the conclusion drawn
when it is assumed that version I is the operative structure-performance
relationship. A one standard deviation increase in the size of the deposit
demand slope estimate is sufficient to reduce the ratio of estimated coeffi-
cients on borrowers' and owners' welfare effects to 0.9, reflecting a slight bias
in favor of owners' welfare. Unless there is reason to rule out the possibility
that the version I structure-performance relationship underlies the FDIC
decision making, the results oi this analysis must be interpreted as leaving
unresolved the question of whether or not any regulatory bias exists.
4. Conclusion
This paper has shown how, with proper recogrntion of the unique
character of banking products, the traditional public interest point of view in
banking regulation and market structure analysis can be formalized in terms
of a flexible Bergsonian social welfare function. Given a proper definition of
observable borrower and depositor surplus measures,' one convenient and
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applicable form which the social welfare function may take is the sum of
borrower surplus, depositor surplus and bank profits; a form similar in spirit
and substance to the familiar sum of consumer and producer surplus. Using
such a social welfare function as an index of the public interest has clear
conceptual and analytical advantages over traditional measures of banking
market performance such as interest rates, costs, and profitability. In
addition to having a rigorous and unambiguous relation to familiar notions
of individual and social welfare, the social welfare function offers an
empirically usable method of summarizing and integrating the often counter-
vailing aspects of performance, such as efficiency and equity.
Section 3 demonstrated how the social welfare methods might be applied
to study regulatory decision-making in the important area of bank mergers.
If the FDIC is presumed to be benign when considering merger applications,
it may be assumed to approve those mergers which are expected to increase
social welfare, and to deny those which are expected to reduce social welfare.
The published decisions of the FDIC show a clear awareness of the
structure-performance literature and its predictions concerning movements of
loan rates, deposit rates and bank profitability in response to changes in
concentration, and at least an implicit awareness of the welfare effects of
those movements. The probit analysis of the FDIC's merger decisions has led
to several general conclusions about the nature of that decision-making
process. However, caution is called for in interpreting the empirical results.
The results reported cannot be interpreted as having 'revealed' the true
regulatory preference of the FDIC. An entirely different approach would be
required in order to attempt that task. Nor can it legitimately be inferred
from the explanatory power of the surplus and profit variables that one or
another of the various S-P versions considered is the 'correct' one, or that it
underlies the regulator's decision-making. Rather, the legitimate inferences
from the empirical results obtained are of the following, more hypothetical
nature.
If the structure-performance relationship is of the more controversial
dichotomous or non-linear forms found in the literature, then the pattern of
decisions taken by the FDIC shows that predictable welfare effects on
borrowers, depositors, and bank owners are not reflected in their decision-
making. If, however, the structure-performance relationship is of the more
common linear form found in the literature, then the evidence strongly
suggests that the welfare effects on borrowers and bank owners are reflected
in the pattern of decisions taken in a way which is justifiable from a social
welfare point of view.
At the same time, the analysis strongly suggests that if there are adverse
effects on depositors of increased concentration through bank mergers, then
they tend generally to be ignored. This conclusion persists under consider-
able variation in the assumed magnitude of the relationship of concentration
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to deposit rates, and under wide variation in the estimated responsiveness
of deposit demands to deposit rate changes. There is one possible explanation
for this this which would tend to vindicate the FDIC from charges that it
was insensitive to depositors' welfare. If, as seems plausible over the sample
period, Regulation Q deposit interest ceilings were known to be binding on
the banks in the relevant markets, then it seems reasonable for the FDIC
to have expected market deposit rates to be unaffected by the mergers. If
this were true, the calculated changes in depositor surplus used in the
analysis here would exaggerate the welfare effects on depositors which the
FDIC had reason to expect. If this were the case, however, it is surprising
that the structure-performance studies done over roughly the same time
period continued to find reason to expect some decline in deposit rates to
accompany increases in concentration.
On the question of regulatory bias towards borrowers or bank owners, the
results of the analysis are suggestive, yet largely inconclusive. For three out
of four versions of the structure-performance relationship considered, it
would appear that some bias in favor of borrowers' welfare exists. This
conflicts, however, with the results of the fourth case which, if anything, tend
to suggest some bias in favor of bank owners. More detailed, less aggregated
studies would be needed to resolve the question of regulatory bias .
In spite of the level of aggregation and the size of the sample of decisions
considered, the analysis here has served to draw attention to the distri-
butional implications of banking regulatory policy. Since there are, inevi-
tably, redistributive effects of the administrative decisions taken by regulatory
agencies such as the FDIC, the appropriateness to society's distributional
goals of the actual or implicit way in which the welfare of one group is
weighed against that of another .in the decision-making process, and the
adequacy of the process itself in achieving the authorities' intended distri-
butional effects, are subjects worthy of social concern and further research.
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